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Abstract: 
We estimate the impact of a differential treatment of paid employees versus self-employed 
workers in a public health insurance system on the entry rate into entrepreneurship. In Germany, 
the public health insurance system is mandatory for most paid employees, but not for the self-
employed, who usually buy private health insurance. Private health insurance contributions are 
relatively low for the young and healthy, and until 2013 also for males, but less attractive at the 
other ends of these dimensions and if membership in the public health insurance allows other 
family members to be covered by contribution-free family insurance. Therefore, the health 
insurance system can create incentives or disincentives to starting up a business depending on 
the family’s situation and health. We estimate a discrete time hazard rate model of 
entrepreneurial entry based on representative household panel data for Germany, which include 
personal health information, and we account for non-random sample selection. We estimate 
that an increase in the health insurance cost differential between self-employed workers and 
paid employees by 100 euro per month decreases the annual probability of entry into self-
employment by 0.38 percentage points, i.e. about a third of the average annual entry rate. The 
results show that the phenomenon of entrepreneurship lock, which an emerging literature 
describes for the system of employer provided health insurance in the USA, can also occur in a 
public health insurance system. Therefore, entrepreneurial activity should be taken into account 
when discussing potential health care reforms, not only in the USA and in Germany. 
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Abbreviations: 
HICD Health insurance cost differential 
PHI Private health insurance 
PIT Personal income tax 
SHI Statutory health insurance 
1 Introduction 
Historically health insurance systems were derived from the desire to protect paid employed 
workers, with the implicit assumption that the self-employed are in a position to take care of 
themselves. Such health insurance systems implicitly create various incentives or disincentives 
to forego paid employment and start up as an entrepreneur. An emerging literature finds that 
employer provided health insurance in the USA implies an entrepreneurship lock effect in the 
sense that workers insured through their employers are reluctant to enter into self-employment 
because they do not want to lose their insurance coverage (e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al., 1996; Fairlie 
et al., 2011). However, almost nothing is known about the effects of public health insurance 
systems on entrepreneurial activity. Closing this gap in the literature is an important task. Health 
care systems are frequently overhauled in many countries, not least because of the challenges 
posed by ageing populations. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is a well-known 
example of a far-reaching health care reform that introduces elements of a public health 
insurance system in the USA. Given the importance of entrepreneurship in modern knowledge-
based economies with respect to innovation, growth, and employment creation (according to 
Carree and Thurik, 2003; Acs and Audretsch, 2005; Van Praag and Versloot, 2007), it is crucial 
to learn about effects of changes to public health insurance systems on entrepreneurial activity.1 
The German health care system is particularly well suited to study such effects, because it 
creates significant variation in incentives and disincentives for self-employment across workers 
                                                 
1 Blanchflower et al. (2001) report that 64% (57%) of West (East) Germans say they would prefer to be self-
employed, but the actual self-employment rate is only 10% (6%). The authors document that this gap is large 
across all of the 23 industrial countries included in their analysis. This sizable latent supply of entrepreneurs 
suggests that there is potential to raise actual entrepreneurship rates by reducing barriers and setting incentives. 
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that changed frequently over time and can be exploited for identification. In the German hybrid 
system, public and private health insurance co-exist in a highly regulated legal framework. 
Germany’s health care system is sometimes referred to as the Bismarck model; variants of this 
model can also be found in other countries in continental Western Europe, Asia, Latin America, 
and in many of the formerly communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Gerlinger and 
Schmucker, 2009).2 
In Germany, public health insurance is obligatory for most paid employees, while the self-
employed can generally choose between private health insurance and voluntary membership in 
the public health insurance system after leaving paid employment. While public health 
insurance contributions are a percentage of gross labor income, premiums in private health 
insurance depend on age and a health assessment at entry, and until 2013 also on gender. 
Contribution rates into public health insurance varied by statutory health insurance providers 
until 2008. Importantly, membership in public health insurance allows a spouse with income 
below a certain threshold and children to be covered by family health insurance for free, while 
private health insurance must be purchased for each family member. Therefore, when an 
individual considers switching from paid employment to self-employment, the differential in 
health insurance costs between the two alternatives depend on the family situation and the age, 
gender, and health status of all family members. Legal changes in the deductibility of health 
insurance contributions from the personal income tax base in 2005 and 2010 provide additional 
variation. 
We use the Socio-economic Panel (SOEP), a representative household panel survey for 
Germany, which provides detailed individual information on employment transitions and the 
determinants of self-employment known from the literature, as well as health insurance 
                                                 
2 Even in countries not following the Bismarck model, public and private health insurance often co-exist. For 
example, Besley et al. (1998, 1999) analyze the interactions between the public and private health care sectors in 
the UK. 
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coverage and the health situation of the household members. This allows us to simulate the 
individual health insurance cost differential between the two alternatives of self-employment 
and paid employment. Carefully controlling other potentially relevant factors such as income, 
age, gender, and health of the family members, we estimate the effect of the cost differential on 
the probability of entry into self-employment for paid employees. A discrete time hazard rate 
model avoids survivorship bias in the sample of paid employees, and we control for non-random 
selection into this sample. 
The results indicate that an increase in the health insurance cost differential between self-
employment and paid employment by 100 euro per month (the standard deviation is 120 euro) 
decreases the probability of entry into self-employment by 0.38 percentage points, i.e. about a 
third of the average annual entry rate. This shows that entrepreneurial activity is sensitive to 
changes in the health insurance system that alter the cost differential. Further investigation 
shows that men respond more strongly to these incentives than women. The results are robust 
with respect to specification choices and assumptions with regard to the health insurance cost 
differential. Our conclusions are also supported when we estimate reduced-form models with 
the determinants of the health insurance cost differential as explanatory variables instead of the 
cost differential itself. 
In the following section, we provide an overview of the relevant literature and point out 
our contributions. Section 3 briefly describes Germany’s hybrid system of public and private 
health insurance as well as the tax deduction. Section 4 is devoted to the empirical methodology, 
and Section 5 describes the household panel data we use. The empirical results are provided in 
Section 6, and Section 7 concludes the analysis. 
2 Extant literature and our contributions 
The emerging literature on entrepreneurship lock has its roots in the job-lock literature. This 
literature describes the barrier that employer provided health insurance potentially poses on job 
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mobility in the USA, since employees may fear to lose coverage for pre-existing conditions if 
they switch their employer (e.g., Madrian, 1994; Gilleskie and Lutz, 2002). In their eclectic 
theory of entrepreneurship, Verheul et al. (2002) note that health insurance systems increase the 
costs of entrepreneurship if the transition to self-employment implies that the current health 
insurance coverage must be given up. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996) pioneer the empirical analysis 
of entrepreneurship lock in the USA using the Survey of Program Participation and the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics. They investigate if the negative influence of employer-provided 
health insurance on the probability of transition from paid employment to self-employment 
decreases if the switching person can be covered by the spouse’s health policy; they also explore 
the impact of family size. The authors cannot draw clear conclusions because of large standard 
errors. These may result from the inefficiency of the method, which uses only very limited 
variation. In our analysis, we exploit significantly more variation on a continuous scale of cost 
differences. 
Using a similar strategy as Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996), but the larger, Current Population 
Survey (CPS), Wellington (2001) finds a significant positive effect of having health insurance 
through one’s partner on the probability of being self-employed. Also based on the cross-
sectional CPS, Lombard (2001) similarly reports that married women are more likely to be self-
employed if their husbands have health insurance. Estimating probability models of being self-
employed implies potential issues of survival bias and reverse causality. We improve on this by 
estimating hazard rate models of the probability of entry into self-employment based on panel 
data, where the explanatory variables are observed before a transition is made. 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007) focus on self-employment at older ages using the Health 
and Retirement Study, include indicators of own and spousal health insurance coverage in their 
empirical transition model, and conclude that their results are only partly reconcilable with job 
lock. They note that employers who provide health insurance in the USA may also tend to offer 
quality jobs, which may confound the analysis, as also emphasized by Gilleskie and Lutz 
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(2002). In our German setting, all paid employees with labor income below a fixed threshold 
are obliged to be covered under statutory public health insurance, so the issue of correlations of 
unobserved job heterogeneity and health insurance coverage do not occur. 
Fairlie et al. (2011) link consecutive CPS surveys to create a short two-year panel, which 
allows them to study business creation using the large data base. Their approach exploits a 
discontinuity at age 65, which is the threshold when coverage under Medicare begins in the 
USA. This should make the loss of employer-provided health insurance less relevant and 
therefore facilitate entry into self-employment. The results support the view that employer-
provided health insurance in the USA creates an entrepreneurship lock effect. 
None of the articles mentioned so far calculate health insurance costs in the alternatives of 
paid employment or self-employment. Therefore, the quantitative results of each paper can only 
be interpreted in the immediate institutional contexts of each analysis. Since we estimate a 
marginal effect of the individual health insurance cost differential on the probability of entry 
into self-employment, our estimated effect size can be interpreted more generally. 
Four articles analyze the effect of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA86) and its amendments 
in the USA on self-employment and transition probabilities. This policy reform allowed 
entrepreneurs to deduct increasing portions of their health insurance premiums from their 
taxable income. Heim and Lurie (2010) and Gurley-Calvez (2011) use a panel of tax return 
data, whereas Velamuri (2012) and Gumus and Regan (2014) employ CPS data. The results 
from the four articles suggest that a lower after-tax price of health insurance in self-employment 
increases the self-employment and entry rates and decreases the exit rate, although Gumus and 
Regan (2014) do not find a significant effect on the entry probability. 
The extant literature is limited to considering the health insurance system in the USA, 
which is dominated by employer-provided health insurance. The literature lacks 
microeconometric investigations of the effects of public health insurance systems on the 
probability of entry into self-employment. Most countries in the world implement some type 
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and some extent of public health insurance, and this is also relevant for the USA since the 
introduction of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Jackson (2009) provides the 
only study considering state mandated health insurance, also in the USA. He estimates that 
Massachusetts’ health insurance mandate policy implemented in 2007 decreased the likelihood 
of new firm formation in Massachusetts versus neighboring New Hampshire in the border 
region. He attributes this to the higher financial burdens for entrepreneurs brought by the policy. 
Again, in contrast to our study, this cost increase is not quantified, which makes it difficult to 
relate the effect size to other contexts. 
A related, but distinct stream of literature investigates the determinants of health-insurance 
coverage of the self-employed. This issue is of special interest in the USA, where a large number 
of self-employed persons lack health insurance (Perry and Rosen, 2004). A number of articles 
(Gruber and Poterba, 1994; Heim and Lurie, 2009; Selden, 2009; Gumus and Regan, 2013) 
estimate the impact of the improved tax deductions of health insurance premiums brought by 
TRA86 on health insurance demand among the self-employed. They all find significant effects 
in the expected direction, which provides another indication that the self-employed respond to 
monetary incentives in the context of health insurance. 
3 Germany’s hybrid health insurance system 
3.1 Statutory and private health insurance 
Germany’s health care system is characterized by the co-existence of public, non-profit 
statutory health insurance (SHI) and for-profit private health insurance (PHI). Almost 90 
percent of the population is covered under SHI (Federal Ministry of Health, 2013), which is 
regulated by federal law, primarily the Code of Social Law V (Sozialgesetzbuch V). We cover 
the most important institutions and facts for Germany relevant during the period of analysis 
(2000-2011). 
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Health care is universal in the sense that since 2009, health insurance (public or private) is 
obligatory for all inhabitants of Germany, and even before, only a very small fraction of the 
population was not covered by any health insurance. According to numbers reported by Gress 
et al. (2005), only 0.12 percent of the paid employees and 0.85 percent of the self-employed 
were not covered by any health insurance in 2003. 
Paid employees are compulsorily insured under SHI if their gross pay does not exceed the 
obligatory insurance limit (Versicherungspflichtgrenze). This limit is adjusted annually and 
increased from €3297.83 per month in 2000 (US$3321 on 1/1/00) to €4125.00 in 2011 ($5502 
on 1/1/11). Employees with higher salary can opt out of the SHI system and choose PHI instead, 
which is offered by for-profit private insurance companies. 
The SHI system is based on the idea of solidarity and the ability-to-pay principle. 
Therefore, SHI contributions are not risk-related. Instead, they are a certain percentage of the 
insured person’s gross salary, but the latter is only considered up to the contribution assessment 
ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). This ceiling is adjusted annually and was increased from 
€3297.83 per month in 2000 to €3712.50 in 2011.3 Within the SHI system, insured persons can 
choose one of several non-profit SHI funds, also known as sickness funds. Until 2008, 
contribution rates differed between the SHI funds. Since 2009, there is a unique contribution 
rate, but SHI funds can charge an income-independent extra premium from all members if the 
contributions are insufficient.4 These provisions are intended to allow for some degree of 
competition between the SHI funds, but in practice competition is rather limited because 
services are regulated to a large extend and therefore very similar. The differences in 
contribution rates were rather small, and the extra premium was no more than €8 per month. 
Table A 1 in Appendix A shows the contribution rates of SHI funds and groups of SHI funds 
                                                 
3 Until 2002, the obligatory insurance limit and the contribution assessment ceiling were identical. 
4 Since 2015, extra premiums are a percentage of income. 
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by year. Historically, most SHI funds originate from occupational groups or regions, and many 
insurees simply stay with their parents’ SHI fund.5 
Those who are covered under statutory health insurance are additionally obliged to be 
covered under statutory long-term care insurance. The contribution rate, payable on top of the 
rate for statutory health insurance, was 1,7% before and 1,95% since 2009. Employees without 
children pay an additional 0.25% since 2005. In the following, when we refer to health 
insurance, we mean health and long term-care insurance, if not otherwise clear from context. 
The spouse of a married, paying SHI member is covered under so-called family insurance 
in the SHI for free as long as his or her income is below the threshold of marginal employment. 
This threshold was €325 until 2002 and €400 since 2003. Children of a SHI member are covered 
under contribution-free family insurance if they are i.) below 19 years of age, or ii.) below 24 
years of age and with labor income not exceeding the marginal employment threshold, or iii.) 
below 26 years of age and in education. 
Specific regulations apply for marginal employment. Employees earning less than the 
threshold of marginal employment mentioned above are covered by SHI, but do not need to pay 
contributions. The employer paid a contribution rate of 10% until 2002, 11% until 2007, and 
13% since 2007; this is only relevant for our analysis in a specification where we consider that 
employers are able to shift the burden onto their employees. Since 2003, employee’s 
contributions are gradually faded in within the zone of monthly income between €400 and €800 
according to a formula, which includes a factor annually determined by the Ministry of Health. 
The employer’s contribution is calculated the same way as for regular higher income. 
In contrast to the SHI, premiums for PHI policies are based on risk and independent of 
income. PHI premiums are determined by age and an initial health assessment. In the period of 
our analysis, women had to pay higher premiums than men; health insurance policies sold since 
                                                 
5 The introduction of the more salient extra premiums may have triggered more awareness and more switching 
between SHI funds since 2009 (Schmitz and Ziebarth, 2011). 
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December 21, 2013 may no longer discriminate by gender. In contrast to family insurance in 
the SHI system, PHI policies have to be bought for each family member, with premiums 
determined by each person’s individual risk assessment. PHI also includes private long-term 
care insurance. 
Contributions to SHI and long term care insurance are split between employers and 
employees. Until July 2005, each side paid 50% of the contributions; since then, employees pay 
0.9 percentage points of the SHI contribution rate alone. In Saxony, employees pay one 
percentage point of the long-term care insurance contributions alone, to compensate for an 
additional holiday. Correspondingly, for high-income employees with PHI, the employer pays 
half the PHI premium insofar as this amount does not exceed the employer’s maximum 
contribution to SHI, which is determined by the contribution assessment ceiling and the 
employer’s SHI contribution rate. The statutory incidence of the contributions is not necessarily 
equal to the economic incidence. It is possible that employers are able to shift more or less of 
their statutory burden to the employees by paying lower wages (or vice versa). The statutory 
split is very salient. Employees see their contribution to SHI as a payroll deduction on their pay 
check, or they directly pay their share of the PHI premium, but they do not see their employer’s 
contributions. Chetty et al. (2009) document the behavioral importance of salience of taxes. 
Therefore, in the main analysis we assume that the statutory pay burden equals the perceived 
economic burden relevant for individual decisions, i.e., the burden is roughly split by half 
between employers and employees. In a robustness check, we explore the assumption of a full 
shift of the burden onto the employees. 
Self-employed persons are not obliged to be insured in the SHI system.6 They can buy PHI, 
or they can choose to be voluntary members in the SHI system if they were SHI members for 
at least 12 months immediately prior to becoming self-employed, or if they were SHI members 
                                                 
6 Exceptions apply for artists, writers, and journalists. 
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for at least 24 months within the last five years. Thus, those who switch from paid employment 
to self-employment are usually eligible for voluntary SHI membership, except for high income 
employees with PHI. The self-employed pay the full SHI contributions or PHI premiums, i.e. 
both the employer’s and the employee’s shares. If they are covered under voluntary SHI, they 
have to prove their income to their SHI fund by submitting their income tax assessment notice, 
otherwise the contribution assessment ceiling (see above) is used to calculate the SHI 
contributions. As an additional measure to prevent income-underreporting, there is a lower limit 
of income applicable to compute the SHI contributions of the self-employed. In general this 
lower limit is three quarters of a defined reference value, which is adjusted annually. It rose 
from €2290.59 per month in 2000 to €2625 in 2011. 
3.2 Tax deduction rules for health insurance costs 
Health insurance expenses – SHI contributions as well as PHI premiums – can be deducted 
from the personal income tax (PIT) base. The German PIT is directly progressive and was 
changed significantly within our period of observation. Marginal tax rates ranged from 22.9% 
to 51% in 2000 and were reduced in several steps to a range from 15% to 42% in 2005; in 2007, 
a new tax bracket with a top marginal tax rate of 45% was introduced.7 The basic tax allowance 
was also increased in various steps from €6,902 per year in 2000 to €8,004 in 2011 for a single 
taxpayer, and double these amounts for married joint filers. The tax schedule and its changes 
influence health insurance costs because the deduction is worth more in terms of absolute tax 
savings when marginal tax rates are higher. 
The rules for the tax deduction of health insurance expenses as provisional expenditures 
(Vorsorgeaufwendungen), in conjunction with expenses for pension and unemployment 
insurance, were changed in 2005 and again in 2010. In the procedure applied before 2005, all 
provisional expenditures are summed together, and there are three relevant ceilings for 
                                                 
7 In addition, a mandatory so-called solidarity surcharge of 5.5% of the PIT applies. 
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calculating the annual deduction amount. First, €3,068 minus 16% of the employee’s wage 
income can be deducted beforehand.8 This works in favor of the self-employed, who do not 
have wage income; the idea is to compensate them for the absence of an employer’s social 
insurance contributions. Remaining provisional expenditures can be deducted in full up to the 
second ceiling of €1,334. Finally, half of any remainder can be deducted up to the third ceiling 
of €667. In total, a single self-employed person could deduct up to €5069 per year, given large 
provisional expenditures. After the introduction of new rules in 2005, the tax authorities still 
perform a higher-yield test to the benefit of each taxpayer between the old and the new rules. 
Starting in 2005, provisional expenditures for pension insurance were treated separately in 
the tax code. All other provisional expenditures, including health insurance expenses, were now 
deductible up to €1,500 for paid employees and up to €2,400 for the self-employed, again 
recognizing the lack of employer’s contributions for the latter group. Following a ruling of the 
Federal Constitutional Court, in 2010, these ceilings were raised by €400 each. If the health 
insurance expenses exceed these limits, they can be deducted in full without a limit since 2010, 
but in this case, no other expenses within the category of other provisional expenditures are 
deductible anymore, and expenditures for private health insurance contributions are only 
deductible insofar as they cover benefits comparable to SHI. 
4 Empirical methodology 
4.1 Hazard rate model of entry into self-employment with sample selection 
We are interested in transitions from paid employment to self-employment. In a random utility 
model, a person i in paid employment in period t chooses to switch to self-employment in the 
following period if utility in self-employment (se) exceeds utility in paid employment (pe). 
Utility 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑗 in alternative 𝑗𝜖{𝑠𝑒, 𝑝𝑒} is assumed to be a function of the health insurance costs 
                                                 
8 The ceilings mentioned in this section double for married joint filers. 
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for the household in this alternative, HICitj, observed characteristics xit, and an error term itj 
that includes any relevant unobservables: 
𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑗(𝐻𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑗, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 𝐻𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗
′ 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑗. (1) 
The parameter  of the health insurance costs is expected to be negative and assumed to 
be the same in paid employment and self-employment, because one euro disposable for 
consumption should yield the same utility in both employment states. The parameters j of the 
characteristics xit may vary across alternatives, because these characteristics may shift tastes for 
one or the other alternative; for example, a self-employed father may induce the offspring’s 
wish to be self-employed as well. 
The probability of entry into self-employment conditional on the HICitj and xit equals the 
probability that utility from self-employment Uit,se is higher than utility from paid employment 
Uit,pe. Let entryit denote a binary variable that equals one if a person switches from paid 
employment to self-employment between observation times t and t+1, and zero otherwise. 
Assuming that the error terms itj follow standard normal distributions9, we obtain:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝐻𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑠𝑒 , 𝐻𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑝𝑒, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) =  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑈𝑖𝑡,𝑠𝑒(𝐻𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑠𝑒 , 𝑥𝑖𝑡) > 𝑈𝑖𝑡,𝑝𝑒(𝐻𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑝𝑒, 𝑥𝑖𝑡)) =  
𝜙(𝛼(𝐻𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑠𝑒 − 𝐻𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡,𝑝𝑒) + (𝛽𝑠𝑒 − 𝛽𝑝𝑒)′𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 𝜙(𝛼 𝐻𝐼𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡), (2) 
where the health insurance cost differential HICDit = HICit,se – HICit,pe, and  se-pe. All the 
explanatory variables in xit as well as the HICDit are measured before potential entries into self-
employment occur, which alleviates potential endogeneity concerns. The calculation of the 
HICDit involves an estimation of the counter-factual health insurance costs after a transition to 
                                                 
9 Our assumption of normally distributed errors can be motivated by the central limit theorem and leads to a probit 
model (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 477), whereas McFadden’s (1974) assumption of i.i.d. type I extreme 
value disturbed itj leads to a logit model. The probit specification has the advantage that it can accommodate the 
selection correction described below. Empirically, probit and logit models generally lead to similar results because 
of the similarity of the cumulative logistic and normal distributions. 
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self-employment; we describe this in Section 4.2. Before estimating this probit model by 
maximum likelihood, two econometric issues warrant special attention in this context. 
First, the probability of switching to self-employment may change with tenure in paid 
employment. It may decrease due to habituation, or it may increase because the experience and 
networks one builds up as a paid employee may help to venture out on one’s own. Therefore, 
we include twelve dummy variables indicating the duration of the current spell in paid 
employment in the vector xit. By conditioning on this very flexible specification of the baseline 
hazard, the probit model of the transition probability in equation (2), estimated on the data in 
person-period format, can equivalently be written as a general survival model, as described in 
Jenkins (1995), Sueyoshi (1995), and Caliendo et al. (2010). We use annual data because the 
survey interviews occur once a year and the covariates are not available at higher frequencies. 
By applying the discrete time hazard rate model, we take into account state dependence and 
avoid survivorship bias. The model consistently accounts for both, right-censored spells, i.e. 
spells of paid employment where we do not observe the end of the spell because persons are 
still employed in the last year of observation, and left-censored spells, because retrospective 
employment history information in our data allow us to recover the correct spell duration even 
in case employment already started before the first survey interview of a person. 
The second potential issue is that in our context, the sample at risk of the transition from 
paid employment into self-employment is the sample of observations currently working in paid 
employment. This is a non-random sub-sample, because many persons choose not to work for 
a wage, especially married women; some persons are unemployed; and some persons decided 
to be self-employed in the past already. Therefore, we estimate a model with selection 
correction similar to Heckman (1979). More specifically, we employ the sample selection 
model for binary dependent variables suggested by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981), with 
entry into self-employment as a the binary outcome. The model includes a probit equation that 
describes the probability of selection into paid employment. It is estimated on the full sample 
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including those not working and the self-employed. The error terms of this selection equation 
and of the hazard rate equation (2) are modelled to follow the bivariate normal distribution with 
correlation. The two equations are estimated jointly using the Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood method.10 
4.2 Health insurance cost differential for the household and control variables 
The explanatory variable of central interest in this analysis is the differential in expected costs 
for health insurance between the potential, currently counter-factual alternative of self-
employment and the current situation in paid employment. The relevant cost differential takes 
into account the deductibility of health insurance costs from the personal income tax base. 
We define the health insurance cost differential (HICD) as the minimum total increase in 
SHI contributions and/or PHI premiums (including long-term care insurance) after taxes for the 
total household per month if the paid employee under consideration switches to self-
employment. It may be positive or negative, depending on the individual and household 
situation.11 
The health insurance costs in the current situation are calculated from the information about 
the health insurance situation of the household members contained in our data, including the 
membership in one of the SHI funds listed in Table A 1 with the corresponding contribution 
rates. For the counter-factual situation of self-employment of one of the household members, 
we simulate the total household health insurance costs for the person’s two options, voluntary 
SHI membership or PHI. To predict PHI premiums, we first run a regression of observed private 
                                                 
10 In the transition equation (2), among other variables, we control for the number of children under the age of 17 
in the household, gender, and the interaction of these variables. In the selection equation, we additionally include 
the number of children below three and below six years of age and their interaction terms with the gender dummy, 
because the presence of young children in the household is likely to influence labor force participation, especially 
for women, but not the choice between paid employment and self-employment after controlling for the general 
family situation. 
11 The HICD amount depends on the assumption about cost shifting from employers to employees. As mentioned 
before, in the baseline estimations, we assume that the perceived economic incidence equals the statutory 
incidence, i.e., the burden is roughly split by half. We assess the sensitivity of the results with respect to this 
assumption in a robustness check. 
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health insurance premiums of actually self-employed persons on characteristics determining 
PHI premiums. These include the age, gender, and health when signing the PHI contract, co-
payments, and eligibility for government aid for civil servants and their families. Appendix B 
describes this estimation in detail. 
The income tax deduction is simulated using an adaption of the tax-benefit 
microsimulation model “STSM” for Germany (Steiner et al., 2012). The simulation accounts 
for the details of the progressive PIT, such as joint taxation of married couples and tax benefits 
for families with children, and incorporates the changes in the tax code over time, such as the 
two reforms of the tax deduction of health insurance expenses and the changes in the tax 
schedule mentioned above. 
To calculate the HICD, we assume that the person entering self-employment chooses the 
alternative of voluntary SHI or PHI that is cheaper for the household; we discuss possible 
implications of differences in services and benefits between the two insurance options further 
below. High-income paid employees who are already insured under PHI cannot choose to 
switch back to voluntary SHI, so for them we calculate the HICD acknowledging that they have 
to stay in PHI. 
Concerning income, for the calculation of the HICD, we assume that the person 
considering to switch to self-employment expects to earn the same amount in self-employment 
as he or she currently earns in paid employment. This allows us to focus on the effect of the 
health insurance system without mixing it with the effect of income expectations that may differ 
between paid employment and self-employment for other reasons. The rich set of independent 
variables we include and flexible functions of current income control for such expectations.12 
                                                 
12 As an example for the calculation of the HICD, consider a family forming a household with a male main earner 
in full-time paid employment and covered under SHI, a wife not participating in the labor market, who stays at 
home to take care of two young children, and a young adult daughter in paid employment with SHI. The wife and 
the two children are covered contribution-free under family insurance. The male bread-winner model with a non-
participating wife reflects a traditional family model (still) wide-spread in Germany. If the main earner switches 
to self-employment, he can stay in voluntary SHI, but has to pay both the employee’s and employer’s shares of the 
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PHI policies usually offer more benefits than SHI funds, and physicians tend to treat PHI 
patients preferentially, because they are often able to charge higher prices to PHI providers. Per 
se, this may put into question that consumers compare the two options on a cost basis only. We 
adopt three strategies to account for this. 
First, we control for the possession of supplementary PHI policies that any SHI members 
can buy to supplement their benefits. Most prominently, these additional benefits typically 
include eligibility for a hospital room with no more than two beds and treatment by the head 
physician in a hospital, which full PHI policies usually also offer. This control variable should 
capture the individual preference for premium health insurance benefits. Second, in a robustness 
check, we recalculate the HICD by adding the average cost of additional private health 
insurance policies to the contributions of all SHI members in order to compare costs between 
SHI and PHI plans with more similar benefits. Third, in a radical robustness check, we assume 
that when considering entry into self-employment, everybody only considers PHI because of 
the better benefits and nobody chooses voluntary SHI, and recalculate the HICD accordingly. 
The current wage and salary income as an employee may have an effect on the probability 
of transition to self-employment and is also correlated with the HICD because SHI contributions 
dependent on income. Therefore, it is important to control for income effects through a flexible 
functional form.13 Similarly, health, age, gender, and the number of children are important 
                                                 
contributions. If he switches to PHI, his wife and the young children lose their family insurance, and the family 
must buy PHI plans for them as well. The adult daughter remains covered under her SHI. We assume that the 
cheaper alternative of voluntary SHI or PHI is chosen, which minimizes the total HICD between self-employment 
and paid employment for the whole family. If somebody in the family is unhealthy (except the adult daughter, who 
is covered by SHI in any case) or the parents are older, voluntary SHI is likely to be the cheaper option for the 
family. In contrast, if the adult daughter switches to self-employment, nothing changes for the father, who keeps 
his SHI coverage, and the mother and young children, who continue to be covered under family insurance through 
the father’s SHI membership. The adult daughter can choose voluntary SHI or PHI for herself without further 
consequences to the others. PHI will be cheaper for the young women if she is healthy and has higher income. 
Whatever the cheaper choice, the total HICD for the household differs between the different adult household 
members potentially entering self-employment. As another example, in a household where two unmarried adults 
live together and no children are present, the self-employment and health insurance choice of one person does not 
affect health insurance coverage of the other and only depends on the individual situation. 
13 We consider higher order polynomials and spline functions. 
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control variables because they may have direct effects on the entry probability and are correlated 
with the HICD through estimated PHI premiums for the family.14 With similar reasoning, we 
also include the marital status and the age, health, and income of a spouse, if present. As 
additional control variables, we include determinants of entrepreneurship known from the 
literature (e.g., Parker, 2009): Education, prior working experience and prior unemployment 
experience, non-German nationality as an indicator of a migration background, 
intergenerational background (a dummy variable indicating whether the father was self-
employed when the respondent was 15 years old), and risk aversion (the self-reported 
willingness to take risks on a scale from 0 to 10).15 We also include industry and regional 
dummies, as well as a full set of year dummies to control for the business cycle. 
4.3 Identification of the effect of the health insurance cost differential 
In our econometric estimation, we identify the causal effect of the HICD on the probability of 
entry into self-employment by exploiting variation over individuals that is exogenous after 
controlling for possibly nonlinear effects of income, own and spousal health, gender, marital 
status, the number of children in the household, and the other control variables mentioned 
above. After partialling out the effects of these variables, the remaining partial variation in the 
HICD stems from i.) the discontinuities created by the various discrete thresholds relevant for 
the health insurance system as well as their changes over time as described in Section 3.1, along 
with the variation in contribution rates over SHI funds and time; ii.) the discontinuities in the 
personal income tax system that affect the amount saved through the tax deduction of the health 
costs, and the changes in these tax rules over time, as described in Section 3.2; and iii) the 
effects of specifics in each family’s situation, e.g., the health of the spouse and the coverage of 
children under free family insurance, on counter-factual health insurance costs in self-
                                                 
14 The effect of children on the entry probability is allowed to vary by gender by including an interaction term. 
15 The general willingness to take risks is observed in 2004, 2006, and in all years since 2008. In the other years, 
we impute values observed for the same person in other years. 
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employment through the impact of these specifics on PHI premiums. Therefore, for the 
identification of the causal effect of the HICD we use the variation created by the details of the 
health insurance legislation and tax code and the changes of these institutions over time, which 
are exogenous to the individual, as well as the health insurance cost consequences of own and 
spousal health shocks, which can reasonably be assumed to be exogenous as well after 
controlling for income and education. 
5 Representative household panel data with health information 
5.1 Individual household panel data 
The data requirements for this analysis are fulfilled by the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP), a representative annual household survey collecting detailed information about the 
socio-economic situation of private households in Germany (cf. Wagner et al., 2007). We use 
the waves 2000, when the SOEP was significantly enlarged, through 2012.16 During this time, 
the SOEP covered about 20,000 persons in 11,000 households. The data allow us to observe 
employment transitions and provide all details necessary to simulate the HICD, including the 
PIT deduction, as well as a rich set of control variables. 
In particular, we require health information of the household members for an adequate 
prediction of counter-factual PHI premiums in case of self-employment, and as control 
variables in the transition equation. In our main specifications, we use a self-assessed health 
measure provided annually in the SOEP. Respondents are asked how they would describe their 
current state of health on a five-point scale (1=very good; 2=good; 3=satisfactory; 4=poor; 
5=very poor). Such subjective measures are commonly used in the literature (e.g., Benitez-Silva 
and Ni, 2008; Haan and Myck, 2009) and are generally viewed as good overall reflections of 
individual physical as well as mental health, at least if the analysis is confined to a single 
                                                 
16 The last year is only used to determine if a transition to self-employment occurred between 2011 and 2012. 
  19 
country. Kalwij and Vermeulen (2008) report that objective health measures add little on top of 
self-reported health information in an analysis of employment patterns in Germany. 
Nevertheless, in a robustness check, we alternatively use a more objective measure, the official 
degree of disability, a percentage asserted by a public medical officer and printed in an official 
document that grants access to certain benefits. The advantage of the subjective measure is that 
smaller and temporary differences in a generally good medical condition are captured, which 
would not lead to the issuance of a disability certificate. 
Since we focus on transitions from paid employment to self-employment, note that self-
employment and entrepreneurship do not necessarily denote the same concept: 
Entrepreneurship usually implies risk bearing and innovation, whereas self-employment goes 
along with income risk but not necessarily with innovation. The classification of individuals as 
self-employed is based on a survey question about the occupational status of each respondent. 
If respondents are employed or self-employed in more than one position, they are asked to report 
their status in their primary activity. The sample is restricted to working-age individuals 
between 19 and 59 years of age to avoid distortions through early retirement decisions. It 
excludes farmers, civil servants, pensioners, and those currently in education, vocational 
training, or military service; occupational choices in these groups are likely to follow different 
patterns. It also excludes family members working for a self-employed relative because these 
individuals are not entrepreneurs in the sense of running their own business. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics by employment state 
Table 1 shows the means of relevant variables from the survey by employment state. We divide 
the paid employees further into those who do and those who do not enter self-employment 
between the year of observation and the subsequent year, and report the difference between 
these two means and its significance level. The paid employees form the estimation sample at 
risk of entry into self-employment in the hazard rate model; the others are only included in the 
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estimation of the equation of selection into being a paid employee. Table A 2 in Appendix A 
provides the definitions of the variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics by employment status 
 Not working Self-
employed 
Paid employees 









Paying SHI member 0.575 0.432 0.891 0.694 -0.197 *** 
Family insurance 0.349 0.055 0.043 0.076 0.034 *** 
Private health insurance 0.070 0.506 0.065 0.226 0.161 *** 
Supplementary PHI 0.097 0.119 0.175 0.139 -0.035 ** 
No. family insured kids 0.632 0.413 0.767 0.675 -0.093 ** 
Poor health 2.605 2.366 2.439 2.298 -0.141 *** 
Disability degree 0.039 0.015 0.025 0.018 -0.007  
Age 39.898 43.292 41.362 40.045 -1.317 *** 
Female 0.723 0.355 0.498 0.396 -0.102 *** 
No. of children 0.937 0.698 0.655 0.825 0.171 *** 
Spouse family insured 0.035 0.074 0.113 0.108 -0.005  
Age of spouse 44.537 44.939 43.761 43.466 -0.295  
Spouse paying SHI 0.519 0.416 0.465 0.376 -0.089 *** 
Spousal poor health 2.541 2.468 2.527 2.432 -0.095 *** 
Spousal disability degree 0.048 0.036 0.042 0.036 -0.006  
Labor income (€100) 0.000 37.678 24.708 30.541 5.833 *** 
Spousal labor inc. (€100) 19.380 15.499 14.944 18.315 3.370 *** 
High school degree 0.177 0.467 0.285 0.471 0.186 *** 
Apprenticeship 0.491 0.361 0.509 0.388 -0.120 *** 
Higher techn. college 0.216 0.291 0.262 0.257 -0.005  
University degree 0.121 0.392 0.230 0.408 0.178 *** 
Married 0.641 0.626 0.668 0.643 -0.025  
East 0.270 0.212 0.245 0.204 -0.041 ** 
South 0.237 0.263 0.268 0.267 -0.001  
North 0.107 0.104 0.109 0.116 0.006  
Work exp. (10 yrs) 1.160 1.988 1.901 1.677 -0.224 *** 
Unemployment exp. 2.290 0.504 0.555 0.564 0.009  
German citizenship 0.903 0.954 0.953 0.945 -0.008  
Self-employed father 0.067 0.159 0.068 0.147 0.079 *** 
Willingness to take risks 4.288 5.550 4.642 5.651 1.009 *** 
Duration employment spell 2.899 7.809 9.448 5.773 -3.675 *** 
Agriculture 0.000 0.013 0.012 0.012 -0.001  
Mining, energy, water 0.000 0.002 0.015 0.008 -0.008  
Manuf. durable goods 0.000 0.049 0.111 0.078 -0.033 ** 
Manuf. nondurable goods 0.000 0.046 0.137 0.090 -0.047 *** 
Construction 0.000 0.111 0.056 0.098 0.042 *** 
Trade 0.000 0.128 0.126 0.151 0.024 * 
Hotels, restaurants 0.000 0.029 0.020 0.031 0.012 * 
Transport, communication 0.000 0.037 0.049 0.039 -0.010  
Financials, real estate 0.000 0.069 0.062 0.057 -0.006  
Business services 0.000 0.198 0.078 0.145 0.067 *** 
Public & personal services 0.000 0.238 0.281 0.218 -0.063 *** 
Missing industry 1.000 0.080 0.051 0.073 0.022 ** 
N 18691 9051 56048 510   
Notes: */**/***: Significance of the difference between the means among the employees not entering and those 
entering into self-employment at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv29, 2000-2012. 
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Almost 90% of the paid employees not entering into self-employment are paying members 
in SHI, 4.3% are in marginal employment and covered under free family insurance through the 
spouse’s SHI, and 6.5% have PHI. Among those who make the transition to self-employment 
within the following year, 22.6% are already covered under PHI as a paid employee, reflecting 
the higher mean before-tax labor income of this group (real €3,054 versus €2,471 per month). 
The income difference seems to be partly explained by the higher education of those about to 
venture out on their own: 41% of them have a university degree, but only 23% of the other paid 
employees. The soon-to-be entrepreneurs as well as their spouses are also healthier when 
looking at the self-assessed measure, but there are no significant differences with regard to the 
official disability degree. The other variables confirm the known picture. Those who enter into 
self-employment are more often male, have had a self-employed father, and are more willing to 
take risk than the other paid employees. They are more often active in the business services and 
construction industries and less often in manufacturing and public and personal services (the 
latter category includes employed teachers, for example). 
Table 2: Mean simulated health insurance costs 
 Paid employees 






Actual health insurance costs 187.890 197.221 9.332 * 
Predicted PHI contributions in SE 363.455 364.702 1.247  
Simulated SHI contributions in SE 379.023 386.654 7.632  
PHI cheaper choice than SHI 0.525 0.586 0.061 *** 
Tax savings in PHI per month 21.364 25.558 4.194 ** 
Tax savings in SHI per month 25.556 21.999 -3.557 * 
Minimum health insurance costs in SE 279.955 276.760 -3.195  
Health insurance cost diff. after taxes 92.065 79.539 -12.527 ** 
.. in real terms, divided by 100 0.916 0.784 -0.132 ** 
…. assuming full shift onto employees -0.730 -0.789 -0.059  
…. SHI plus addit. private health insur. 0.727 0.632 -0.095 * 
…. assuming that PHI is only option 1.537 1.407 -0.130 * 
Notes: */**/***: Significance of the difference between the means among the employees not entering 
and those entering into self-employment at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv29, 2000-2012. 
 
Table 2 shows means of simulated variables needed to calculate the HICD for the 
estimation sample at risk of making the transition from paid to self-employment. We discuss 
these variables going from top to bottom. The mean current health insurance costs are €188 for 
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employees who stay employees and €9 more for those who switch to self-employment in the 
following year, again reflecting the higher average income of the latter group. In the counter-
factual case of self-employment, the persons in the sample would pay an average premium of 
€363-365 per month if they chose PHI. This variable is predicted using the estimated PHI 
premium equation and includes premiums for a spouse and children, if these are present and not 
otherwise covered, as explained in Appendix B. If the person hypothetically entering self-
employment chose voluntary SHI membership, he or she would pay about €16-22 more on 
average. For 53% of the paid employees who do not enter self-employment, a PHI policy would 
be the cheaper choice for the household in case of self-employment; this share is 59% for those 
who actually enter. The health insurance costs reported so far are before tax. Since these 
expenses can partly be deducted from the personal income tax base, the higher costs in case of 
self-employment lead to tax savings of €21-26 on average per month, both with the PHI and 
with the SHI. Taking into account the tax savings, each person chooses the lower cost option 
for the household, PHI or SHI, in case of self-employment. This leads to the hypothetical 
minimum health insurance costs in case of self-employment after taxes of €277-280. The mean 
is lower than the mean of PHI or SHI costs because of the individual choice of the cheaper 
option. Finally, we subtract the actual current health insurance costs for the household from the 
hypothetical costs in case of self-employment, both after taxes, and arrive at the nominal HICD. 
It is €92 per month for paid employees who do not enter into self-employment, and €80 per 
month for those who enter. The difference is significant and may indicate that a higher HICD 
deters persons from entry into self-employment. The next section explores this much more 
rigorously using the econometric model which controls for important covariates, state 
dependence, and selection. For the estimation, we deflate the HICD amount using the Consumer 
Price Index and divide by 100.17 
                                                 
17 The last three rows of Table 2 show alternative measures of the real HICD under different assumptions, which 
we discuss in Section 6.2. 
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Figure 1 depicts the distribution of this real HICD in a histogram for all paid employees in 
the estimation sample. Clearly, the HICD is positive for the most part of the distribution, i.e., 
health insurance costs for the household increase when a member switches to self-employment 
because of the loss of the employer’s contributions. Insofar, the German health insurance 
system may constitute a barrier for entry into self-employment. However, there is also an 
important negative part of the HICD distribution. For example, for a young, healthy and 
unmarried male the full premium to PHI in case of self-employment can be cheaper than the 
employee’s share to SHI contributions. Thus, the health insurance system may provide 
incentives to enter self-employment for persons whose income is not high enough to opt out of 
the SHI as a paid employee. For them, self-employment lifts the barrier to PHI. 
Figure 1: Histogram of the simulated health insurance cost differential 
 
Note: The histogram shows the distribution of the simulated differential in the monthly health insurance costs 
between the alternatives of self-employment and regular employment in real 100 euros of 2005. Here, the incidence 
assumption is that the burden of the health insurance costs is shared between employers and employees according 
to the statutory division, i.e., roughly by half. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv29, 2000-2012. 
 
The histogram further shows that there is a bunching at zero, which indicates that for almost 
15% of the individuals in the sample, health insurance costs for the household would not change 
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at all if they switched to self-employment. For example, this is the case for persons with income 
below the marginal employment threshold who are insured under free family insurance through 
their spouse’s SHI membership, because they can keep their family insurance in self-
employment. Another bunching occurs at the right side of the distribution with a high HICD. 
Again, marginal employment plays a role here, because a marginally employed person who 
cannot be covered under family insurance through a spouse or parent is covered under SHI with 
zero employee’s contributions, but not as a low-income self-employed person. In the latter 
situation, the person has to pay the full income-independent PHI premium, or as a voluntary 
SHI member, the lower limit of income for the assessment of SHI contributions for the self-
employed applies. In both cases, costs increase drastically in comparison to free SHI coverage, 
and the health insurance system constitutes a significant barrier for self-employment.  
6 Econometric results 
6.1 The effect of the health insurance cost differential 
Table 3 provides the main results from estimating the hazard rate model of transition from paid 
employment into self-employment in equation (2). The table shows probit coefficients and the 
average marginal effect of the key explanatory variable, the health insurance cost differential 
(HICD) between counter-factual self-employment and paid employment. The standard errors 
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering at the individual level; those of the marginal 
effects are obtained using the Delta Method. Average marginal effects of further variables 
appear in Table A 3 in Appendix A. The estimated probit coefficients from the equation of 
selection into the estimation sample of paid employees are given in Table A 4 and show that 
most of the variables with exclusion restriction (at the bottom of the table) are highly significant. 
The correlation between the error terms of the selection and the transition equations  turns out 
to be significantly different from zero only when restricting the sample to men. 
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Table 3: Self-employment entry probability conditional on health insurance cost differential 
 (1) Full 
sample 








HI cost diff. (€100) -0.0780*** -0.1050*** -0.0170 -0.0797*** -0.0796*** -0.1051*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0236) (0.0289) (0.0176) (0.0184) (0.0311) 
    Marginal effect -0.0038*** -0.0068*** -0.0007 -0.0037*** -0.0039*** -0.0027* 
 (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0016) 
Poor health -0.0484* -0.0822** -0.0093 -0.0463*  -0.0835* 
 (0.0261) (0.0355) (0.0381) (0.0260)  (0.0443) 
Disability degree     -0.4007**  
     (0.2006)  
Age -0.0123** -0.0065 -0.0119 -0.0110* -0.0126** -0.0234** 
 (0.0061) (0.0104) (0.0079) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0099) 
Supplementary PHI -0.0058 0.0342 -0.0094 -0.0096 -0.0067 -0.0459 
 (0.0570) (0.0806) (0.0790) (0.0566) (0.0569) (0.0997) 
Age of spouse 0.0005 0.0130** 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0008 
 (0.0006) (0.0061) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Spousal poor health -0.0456 -0.0413 -0.0490 -0.0451  -0.0702 
 (0.0298) (0.0408) (0.0448) (0.0295)  (0.0500) 
Spousal disability deg.     0.0454  
     (0.2432)  
Spousal labor inc. 
(€100) 
0.0006 -0.0027 0.0017** 0.0006 0.0007 0.0013 
(0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
Female -0.4598***   -0.4676*** -0.4705*** -0.8268*** 
 (0.0630)   (0.0635) (0.0633) (0.1246) 
No. of children 0.1247*** 0.1175*** -0.0387 0.1248*** 0.1290*** 0.1996*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0327) (0.0437) (0.0289) (0.0284) (0.0538) 
Female * no. of childr. -0.1756***   -0.1732*** -0.1776*** -0.2268*** 
 (0.0473)   (0.0468) (0.0471) (0.0831) 
Real wage inc. 
(€ 10,000) 
-8.7656*** -9.4864*** -15.0253***  -8.8006*** -15.0101*** 
(0.5332) (0.6503) (1.6953)  (0.5369) (1.2460) 
Real wage inc. squared 9.7299*** 10.0885*** 43.1929***  9.7741*** 16.7577*** 
 (1.0963) (1.1698) (9.3096)  (1.0999) (2.0724) 
Real wage inc. cubed -3.2599*** -3.3009*** -42.2009***  -3.2722*** -5.5810*** 
 (0.5898) (0.5946) (14.2165)  (0.5910) (1.0308) 
Real wage inc.4 0.2372*** 0.2384*** 9.2632***  0.2380*** 0.4051*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0485) (3.5309)  (0.0487) (0.0840) 
Real wage inc. spline 1    -6.0311***   
    (0.3350)   
Real wage inc. spline 2    1.5228***   
    (0.4200)   
Real wage inc. spline 3    -0.5243   
    (0.9686)   
Real wage inc. spline 4    0.5213   
    (1.5115)   
Real wage inc. spline 5    0.0128   
    (0.1675)   
High school degree 0.2174*** 0.1302 0.2847*** 0.2289*** 0.2201*** 0.4400*** 
 (0.0589) (0.0871) (0.0835) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.1137) 
Apprenticeship 0.0248 0.1757** -0.1602** 0.0216 0.0215 0.0918 
 (0.0571) (0.0813) (0.0775) (0.0570) (0.0564) (0.1034) 
Higher techn. college 0.1412** 0.2656*** 0.0174 0.1353** 0.1390** 0.3154*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0893) (0.0813) (0.0614) (0.0605) (0.1157) 
University degree 0.5691*** 0.5895*** 0.4594*** 0.5654*** 0.5722*** 1.0358*** 
 (0.0631) (0.0894) (0.0927) (0.0633) (0.0627) (0.1294) 
Married -0.0840 0.0913 -0.1196 -0.0708 -0.0895 -0.1068 
 (0.0559) (0.0855) (0.0857) (0.0555) (0.0559) (0.0987) 
East -0.1766*** -0.2822*** -0.0003 -0.2105*** -0.1728*** -0.3093*** 
 (0.0599) (0.0766) (0.0952) (0.0599) (0.0599) (0.1122) 
   . Continued on the following page. 
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Table 3 continued 
 (1) Full 
sample 








South 0.0075 -0.0207 0.0620 0.0032 0.0147 -0.0028 
 (0.0518) (0.0695) (0.0799) (0.0512) (0.0521) (0.0971) 
North 0.0206 -0.0213 0.0780 0.0173 0.0198 0.0419 
 (0.0725) (0.0979) (0.1053) (0.0721) (0.0718) (0.1337) 
Work exp. (10 yrs) 0.3248** 0.3882** 0.2279 0.3043** 0.3231** 0.6761*** 
 (0.1283) (0.1645) (0.1927) (0.1288) (0.1295) (0.2004) 
Work exp. squared -0.0418* -0.0817** -0.0281 -0.0395 -0.0422* -0.0973** 
 (0.0254) (0.0332) (0.0407) (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0427) 
Unemployment exp. -0.0346 -0.0710** 0.1027* -0.0413 -0.0418 -0.0612 
 (0.0380) (0.0339) (0.0558) (0.0331) (0.0346) (0.0672) 
Unempl. exp. squared -0.0006 0.0021 -0.0206*** 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0023 
 (0.0043) (0.0015) (0.0070) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0082) 
German citizenship -0.0135 -0.0285 0.0113 0.0038 -0.0119 0.0425 
 (0.0996) (0.1347) (0.1475) (0.1018) (0.0991) (0.1785) 
Self-employed father 0.2734*** 0.3314*** 0.2495*** 0.2625*** 0.2687*** 0.4733*** 
 (0.0676) (0.0920) (0.0929) (0.0683) (0.0680) (0.1302) 
Willingn. to take risks 0.0766*** 0.0857*** 0.0639*** 0.0763*** 0.0770*** 0.1282*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0153) (0.0142) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0189) 
11 industry dummies p = 0.0306 p = 0.1405 p < 0.0001 p = 0.0314 p = 0.0376 p = 0.0341 
12 duration dummies p < 0.0001 p = 0.0001 p = 0.0002 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p = 0.0179 
Full set year dummies p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p = 0.0110 
Constant 1.8271*** 2.0987*** 1.7326*** 1.8272*** 1.8139*** -2.1436*** 
 (0.0938) (0.1849) (0.1083) (0.0938) (0.0899) (0.3923) 
 -0.0758 -0.1853 -0.1010 -0.0656 -0.0735  
Test of =0: p-value 0.4714 0.0108 0.4556 0.5456 0.4873  
Log var. random effect      0.6769*** 
      (0.1673) 
Log likelihood -44,843.16 -21,359.75 -22,970.24 -44,880.51 -44,850.93 -2,083.6724 
Observations 84,300 39,462 44,838 84,300 84,265  
Selected observations 56,558 28,451 28,107 56,558 56,538 56,558 
Mean outcome 0.0111 0.0128 0.0095 0.0111 0.0111 0.0111 
Notes: Discrete time hazard rate model specified as a probit model with selection correction. This table shows probit 
coefficients of the equation modelling the transition to self-employment; the estimated selection equation is shown in 
Table A 4 in the Appendix. Average marginal effects of the health cost differential are also shown; those of further 
variables appear in Table A 3. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of entry into self-employment between years 
t and t+1. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  is the selection correction 
term. In the rows referring to sets of dummy variables, the p-values derive from tests of joint significance. Definitions of 
the variables are displayed in Table A 2. 
*/**/***: Significance of the coefficient at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv29, 2000-2012. 
 
Column (1) of Table 3 shows the main specification for the full sample. The HICD has a 
negative effect on the probability of entry into self-employment significant at the 1%-level. As 
the HICD is coded in units of 100 euro, increasing the additional cost in case of self-
employment by 100 euro (the standard deviation of the HICD among paid employees is 120 
euro) decreases the entry probability by 0.38 percentage points on average. This is 34% of the 
annual transition rate from paid employment to self-employment of 1.11%, as indicated at the 
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bottom of the table. This indicates that the decision of paid employees to switch to self-
employment is strongly influenced by the additional costs (or cost savings) for health insurance 
for the household. 
The effect is even stronger for men with a relative effect of 54% of the entry rate. For 
women, the effect has the same sign, but is smaller and insignificant. Apparently, women do 
not respond as strongly to monetary incentives provided by the health insurance system as men 
when considering self-employment. Reasons may be the traditional male role of being the main 
bread-earner in Germany, whereas for women, non-pecuniary aspects of self-employment such 
as the flexibility of time and location of work may be more important on average (Georgellis 
and Wall, 2005). 
As mentioned before, it is important to control for possibly non-linear effects of the wage 
income of the paid employees, because these are correlated with the HICD and may have a 
direct effect on self-employment choice. Going back to the full sample, in column (4), we 
replace the fourth order polynomial of income we use in the main specification by a spline 
function with five splines of equal width within the interval from zero to €20,000 per month, 
where the highest spline also includes observations with higher income. We observe that the 
coefficient and marginal effect of the HICD remains almost unchanged, indicating that the 
estimates are not sensitive to the functional form assumption with regard to income. 
Persons with poorer health are less likely to enter self-employment, even after controlling 
for the HICD, which accounts for the higher costs of PHI implied by the poorer health. In the 
main estimation based on the full sample in column (1), a deterioration of health by one point 
on the five point scale of self-assessed general health decreases the entry probability by 0.25 
percentage points on average in the sample (average marginal effect in Table A 3), i.e. 23% of 
the annual transition rate; the standard deviation of the health measure among all employees is 
0.82. Similarly, Parker and Rougier (2007) report that older workers with poor health are less 
likely to move into self-employment in Britain. Self-employment is associated with longer work 
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hours than paid employment and considerable strains (Lewin-Epstein and Yuchtman-Yaar, 
1991), which may deter less healthy persons from this choice, in addition to the implications 
for health insurance costs discussed. The partial effect of spousal poor health is not significant 
when controlling for the HICD in our estimations. In Section 6.3, we show that omitting the 
HICD leads to a significant negative coefficient of poor spousal health. Thus, spousal health 
affects the entry decision, but exclusively through the higher PHI costs implied. 
In column (5) of Table 3, we explore the official degree of disability as an alternative, more 
objective health measure (see Section 5.1), and again find a significantly negative partial effect 
of poorer health. A higher disability degree by ten percentage points decreases the entry 
probability by 0.2 percentage points (Table A 3) or 18% of the entry rate.18 Similarly, higher 
age decreases the likelihood of the transition, ceteris paribus. However, work experience has a 
positive effect at decreasing marginal rates. 
In further robustness checks, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. 
In column (6) of Table 3, we consider an individual-specific random effect with a normal 
distribution. We do not control for selection in this estimation, which seems justified 
considering that the selection term turned out insignificant in the baseline estimation. The 
variance of the individual random effect is significantly different from zero. The estimated 
probit coefficient of the HICD becomes somewhat larger, but not significantly different from 
the point estimate in column (1). The marginal effect, evaluated at the mean values of the 
explanatory variables and the random effect, is closer to zero than in the baseline estimation, 
but not significantly different. We also estimate complementary log-log models with an 
arbitrary discrete distribution of the individual random effect (not reported in the table). We 
achieve convergence with two mass points based on a quasi-Hessian convergence criterion, but 
                                                 
18 For the UK, Jones and Latreille (2011) report that nonwork-limited disabled persons are less likely to be self-
employed than the nondisabled, whereas work-limited disabled men are more likely to be self-employed, which 
could be explained by the greater flexibility self-employment offers in terms of times, hours, and locations. 
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the mass points are not significantly different from each other. We calculate the marginal effects 
for the two latent types at the mean values of the explanatory variables, and then the average 
weighted by the estimated type probabilities. The point estimate is -0.0023 with a standard error 
of 0.0009, which again is not significantly different from the baseline estimate. We conclude 
that the results are not very sensitive to the modelling of unobserved heterogeneity. 
In all specifications, the control variables confirm expectations. Women have a smaller 
self-employment entry rate (cf. Caliendo et al., 2014), especially if children are present in the 
household. The transition probability increases with university education, a self-employed 
father (cf. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000), and a higher willingness to take risk in the year before 
the transition (cf. Caliendo et al., 2009). 
6.2 Different assumptions about the health insurance cost differential 
In this section we explore the sensitivity of the results with respect to the assumptions taken in 
order to calculate the HICD. In the main estimations, we assume that the incidence of the burden 
of the health insurance costs, as perceived by the paid employees when they consider switching 
to self-employment, equals the statutory incidence, i.e., employers and employees bear roughly 
half of the contributions. However, it is possible that employers are able to shift the burden onto 
employees by paying lower wages, or the other way round. Using data from Eurostat on labor 
costs, Ooghe et al. (2003) estimate that more than half of the burden of social security 
contributions are borne by the employees in Europe. Gruber (2000) concludes from a literature 
review that the costs of health insurance are even fully shifted onto the employees. 
In the first column of Table 4, we therefore assume that the total SHI contributions and 
PHI premiums, i.e., both the statutory employee’s and employer’s shares, are effectively borne 
by the employees. This reduces the average real HICD between the alternatives of self-
employment and paid employment from 91.6 to -73.0 euro for the paid employees who do not 
enter self-employment, and from 78.4 to -78.9 euro for those who make the transition (see Table 
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2). In the baseline assumption, the step into self-employment on average implies higher health 
insurance costs, because the nascent entrepreneur loses the employer’s contributions. If the 
employer’s contributions are fully shifted onto the employer anyway, the situation becomes 
relatively cheaper in self-employment on average, because self-employment opens up the PHI 
option, total costs of which are often lower. Despite the drastic shift in the distribution of the 
HICD, the sign and significance level of its estimated coefficient remain the same as in the main 
estimation in the first column of Table 3. The point estimate of the average marginal effect is 
larger in absolute terms here, but the confidence intervals of the two estimates overlap, 
indicating that these are not significantly different. 
In the second column of Table 4, we return to the baseline assumption regarding incidence, 
but re-calculate the HICD by adding the cost of supplementary PHI to the health insurance costs 
associated with SHI. We use the mean of the costs those employees in the sample who actually 
have supplementary PHI report paying for it. As discussed in Section 3.1, this makes the 
benefits and services of the SHI and PHI options more comparable. Again, this decreases the 
average HICD and makes self-employment look more attractive (Table 2). The estimated effect 
of the HICD is very similar to the main estimation. 
Finally, we assess the robustness with respect to the assumption that the choice between 
voluntary SHI and PHI in case of self-employment is determined by the lowest total cost for 
the household (if both options are available). Instead, in the third column of Table 4, we assume 
that everybody considers the HICD associated with PHI in case of self-employment. The 
estimated effect of the HICD becomes somewhat larger in absolute terms than in the main 
estimation, but not significantly different. In summary, we conclude that the results are robust 
to the assumptions taken for the calculation of the HICD. 
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Table 4: Self-employment entry probability with varying assumptions about the health 
insurance cost differential 
 HICD with full shift HICD with suppl. PHI HICD with PHI only 
HICD with full shift (€100) -0.1415***   
 (0.0168)   
HICD with suppl. PHI (€100)  -0.0795***  
  (0.0183)  
HICD with PHI only (€100)   -0.1025*** 
   (0.0170) 
    Marginal effect -0.0068*** -0.0039*** -0.0051*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Poor health -0.0383 -0.0474* -0.0348 
 (0.0260) (0.0262) (0.0260) 
Age -0.0113* -0.0119* -0.0073 
 (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0060) 
Supplementary PHI 0.0089 -0.0081 0.0027 
 (0.0566) (0.0569) (0.0563) 
Age of spouse 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Spousal poor health -0.0426 -0.0455 -0.0366 
 (0.0305) (0.0298) (0.0295) 
Spousal labor inc. (€100) 0.0005 0.0006 0.0001 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Female -0.3956*** -0.4527*** -0.4174*** 
 (0.0621) (0.0630) (0.0627) 
No. of children 0.1308*** 0.1283*** 0.1593*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0288) (0.0311) 
Female * no. of children -0.1711*** -0.1761*** -0.1731*** 
 (0.0479) (0.0472) (0.0470) 
Further control variables Yes Yes Yes 
 -0.0823 -0.0737 -0.0845 
Test of =0: p-value 0.4317 0.4855 0.4085 
Log likelihood -44,802.38 -44,842.51 -45,065.27 
Observations 84,300 84,300 84,631 
Selected observations 56,558 56,558 56,889 
Mean outcome 0.0111 0.0111 0.0111 
Notes: Discrete time hazard rate model specified as a probit model with selection correction. The table shows 
probit coefficients of selected variables in the equation modelling the transition to self-employment; the estimated 
selection equation and the coefficients of the other control variables, which are the same as in Table 3, are available 
from the authors on request. Average marginal effects of the health cost differential are also shown. The dependent 
variable is a binary indicator of entry into self-employment between years t and t+1. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  is the selection correction term. 
*/**/***: Significance of the coefficient at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv29, 2000-2012. 
 
6.3 The effect of health and the family situation on entry into entrepreneurship 
We have discussed which characteristics of household members influence the HICD, and we 
have estimated that the HICD has a sizable and significant effect on the probability of transition 
from paid employment to self-employment. In this section, we take a step back and re-estimate 
the same hazard rate model, but exclude the HICD and directly include factors that determine 
the HICD amount instead. This approach is comparable to the extant literature for the USA, 
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which does not calculate a HICD (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1996; Wellington, 2001; Zissimopoulos 
and Karoly, 2007; Fairlie et al., 2011). Table 5 shows the probit coefficients for the full sample 
and separately for men and women; average marginal effects of the most interesting variables 
appear in the rightmost three columns of Table A 3 in Appendix A. 
In these estimations, poorer health strongly decreases the probability of entry into self-
employment for men. A one point deterioration on the five point scale (std dev.: 0.82) decreases 
the entry probability by 0.59 percentage points on average (Table A 3), i.e. 46% of the mean 
entry rate. In this specification, this is the combined effect of the expected additional PHI 
premiums and any other deterring effect poor health has on self-employment. Poorer health of 
the spouse also decreases the entry probability in the pooled sample and for men in these 
specifications omitting the HICD. The finding that spousal health becomes insignificant when 
including the HICD indicates that the deterring effect of poor spousal health works through 
increasing health insurance costs in case of self-employment, as mentioned before. 
A paid employee currently covered under and paying for SHI, i.e., not in marginal 
employment, is less likely to enter self-employment than somebody who already has PHI. While 
the latter can keep the current PHI contract without a new health assessment when stepping into 
self-employment, the former needs to give up SHI in order to switch to PHI, which requires a 
new health assessment. This constitutes a barrier comparable to entrepreneurship lock in the 
USA, where employees are reluctant to lose their employer provided health insurance. The 
alternative of remaining in voluntary SHI may be too expensive especially for individuals with 
higher income, since the employer’s contributions are lost. Paid employees with marginal 
employment who are covered by free family insurance through their spouse or parent are even 
more hesitant to venture out on their own. Although they may keep their family insurance if 
their income remains below the marginal employment threshold, they may fear to lose family 
insurance should their income exceed it. We separately control for gender, the number of 
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children, and an interaction term of these variables, so any effects of being occupied with 
childcare should be captured by these variables. 
Table 5: Self-employment entry probability conditional on determinants of health insurance 
costs 
 Full sample Men Women 
Paying SHI member -0.4090*** -0.5132*** -0.0438 
 (0.0752) (0.0907) (0.1259) 
Family insurance -0.7497*** -0.9016*** -0.5446*** 
 (0.0940) (0.1759) (0.1364) 
Poor health -0.0366 -0.0852*** 0.0148 
 (0.0233) (0.0315) (0.0343) 
Age -0.0073 -0.0015 -0.0044 
 (0.0056) (0.0092) (0.0071) 
Supplementary PHI 0.0257 0.1199 -0.0473 
 (0.0534) (0.0758) (0.0741) 
No. family insured kids -0.0592* -0.0568 -0.0599 
 (0.0305) (0.0395) (0.0498) 
Spouse family insured 0.1137 0.2154 -2.6913 
 (0.3049) (0.3907) (2.9554) 
Age of spouse 0.0002 0.0133** -0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0067) (0.0020) 
Spouse family insured * age of spouse -0.0004 -0.0089 0.1677** 
 (0.0065) (0.0084) (0.0715) 
Spouse paying SHI 0.0371 -0.0952 0.0784 
 (0.0745) (0.1183) (0.0972) 
Spousal poor health -0.0625** -0.0791* -0.0479 
 (0.0307) (0.0468) (0.0427) 
Spouse family insured * spousal poor health 0.0442 0.0856 -5.2962*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0883) (0.9455) 
Spousal labor inc. (€100) 0.0004 -0.0013 0.0012 
 (0.0008) (0.0023) (0.0008) 
Female -0.3861***   
 (0.0546)   
No. of children 0.1306*** 0.1260*** 0.0208 
 (0.0347) (0.0418) (0.0472) 
Female * no. of children -0.1272***   
 (0.0443)   
Further control variables Yes Yes Yes 
 -0.0525 -0.1919 -0.1346 
Test of =0: p-value 0.6084 0.0006 0.2637 
Log likelihood -48,121.9268 -23,066.8726 -24,521.4381 
Observations 92,515 44,023 48,492 
Selected observations 64,773 33,012 31,761 
Mean outcome  0.0113 0.0129 0.0099 
Notes: Discrete time hazard rate model specified as a probit model with selection correction. The table shows 
probit coefficients of selected variables in the transition equation; the estimated selection equation and the 
coefficients of the other control variables, which are the same as in Table 3, are available from the authors on 
request. Average marginal effects are displayed in Table A 3 in the Appendix. The dependent variable is a 
binary indicator of entry into self-employment between years t and t+1. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  is the selection correction term. Definitions of the 
variables appear in Table A 2. 
*/**/***: Significance of the coefficient at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv29, 2000-2012. 
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A higher number of children covered under free family insurance decreases the entry 
probability for all genders, although this is significant only in the larger pooled sample, 
presumably due to the high correlation with the number of children in the household. The 
negative effect of children under family insurance confirms expectations, because these 
children lose their free family insurance if the employed parent moves to self-employment and 
chooses PHI, unless the other parent is also employed and covered under SHI. Again, voluntary 
SHI may be expensive, and PHI is often the more attractive option for the control group who 
do not have children covered under family insurance. Interestingly, the number of children in 
the household, independent of family insurance coverage, has a positive partial effect for men. 
This shows that we are able to separate opposing effects: On the one hand, an effect of the 
family situation that is unrelated to health insurance costs and may be related to the wish to 
have flexibility in the timing and location of work, and on the other hand, the pure deterring 
effect of the additional health insurance costs. 
We expect that a spouse covered under free family insurance locks in the partner who is 
an employee and a paying SHI member, because a switch to self-employment and purchase of 
PHI would imply that the spouse loses family insurance. We anticipate this barrier to be higher 
if the spouse covered under family insurance is in poor health or older, because this would make 
PHI more expensive. Therefore, we include interaction terms. These turn out to be significant 
for women only; the interaction term with bad health has the expected sign, but not the one with 
age. The average marginal effects in Table A 4, which take into account the interaction terms, 
indicate that a spouse covered under family insurance on average decreases the likelihood of 
entry for women, significant at the 1% level. For men, there is no significant effect.19 
                                                 
19 In the combined sample, there is a smaller positive effect, significant at the 10% level. This is technically possible 
due to the nonlinearity of the model, but we do not have an economic explanation for this effect. 
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7 Conclusion 
We show that a differential treatment of paid employees and self-employed persons in the health 
insurance system has significant effects on the entry rate into self-employment, based on 
representative household panel data for Germany. If the additional costs for health insurance 
for a self-employed person in comparison to a paid employee increase by 100 euro per month, 
the probability of entry decreases by about a third of the annual entry rate. This is a large effect, 
given that the standard deviation of the health insurance cost differential between the options 
of self-employment and paid employment is 120 euro. Our results further show that a spouse’s 
poor health decreases the entry probability through the higher average health insurance costs 
when switching to self-employment, but has no significant direct partial effect. Notably, these 
effects occur in a country with de facto, and since 2009 also de jure, universal health care. The 
extant literature is limited to the USA with its system of typically employer provided health 
insurance. 
The results imply that policymakers interested in stimulating entrepreneurial activity can 
use monetary incentives within the health insurance system, not only in the USA. A direct 
implication of our results is that providing more generous tax deductions of health insurance 
costs for the self-employed increases the entry rate into self-employment, for example. As a 
minimum, in future any health care reform, which may be crafted with intentions unrelated to 
entrepreneurship, should be checked for the incentives and disincentives it creates for self-
employment to avoid unexpected effects on firm formation. 
Our approach of estimating a coefficient of the health insurance cost differential has the 
advantage that the effect size can be compared across countries with different health insurance 
systems, not limited to countries following the Bismarck model. Future research should exploit 
the variety of health care systems in the world, including tax-financed public health services as 
found in the UK, for example, to explore if monetary incentives with regard to health insurance 
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have similar effects on self-employment choice in different systems. This avenue will lead to a 
better understanding of the effects of health care institutions on entrepreneurial activity. In the 
process of health care reform that many countries are undergoing, not least because of ageing 
populations, this will allow to take into account the important effects on entrepreneurship, 
which is becoming increasingly important in innovation based economies. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary tables 
Table A 1: Contribution rates of (groups of) statutory health insurance funds 
Year AOK* BKK* IKK* BEK DAK  KKH TK KBS Average  
2000 13.82 12.59 13.73 13.90 13.80 13.90 13.20 13.50 13.57 
2001 13.99 12.55 13.84 13.90 13.80 13.90 13.20 13.10 13.58 
2002 14.25 13.03 14.23 14.50 14.50 14.50 13.70 12.90 13.98 
2003 14.47 13.66 14.30 14.90 15.20 14.80 13.70 12.90 14.31 
2004 14.39 13.90 14.03 14.75 14.70 14.40 13.70 12.55 14.22 
2005 13.89 13.42 13.69 14.25 14.25 13.70 13.25 11.95 13.73 
2006 13.53 13.04 12.90 13.80 13.80 13.20 13.00 11.80 13.31 
2007 14.35 13.53 13.04 14.40 14.50 13.90 13.50 12.70 13.90 
2008 14.35 13.86 13.06 14.40 14.50 13.90 13.80 12.70 14.00 
Since 2009 Unique contribution rate: 15.5 
* Average over the members of the groups. 
Abbreviations of names of German statutory health insurance funds: AOK = Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse; 
BKK = Betriebskrankenkasse; IKK = Innungskrankenkasse; BEK = Barmer Ersatzkasse; DAK = Deutsche 
Angestellten-Krankenkasse; KKH = Kaufmännische Krankenkasse; TK = Techniker Krankenkasse; KBS = 
Deutsche Rentenversicherung Knappschaft-Bahn-See. 
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Table A 2: Description of variables 
Variable Description 
HI cost diff. (€100) Minimum health insurance cost differential between a household member’s 
alternatives of self-employment and paid employment for the total household after 
taxes. 
Paying SHI member Dummy for a person covered under and paying contributions for statutory health 
insurance (SHI). 
Family insurance Dummy for a person covered under contribution-free family insurance through the 
SHI membership of a spouse or parent. 
Private health insurance Dummy for person currently covered under private health insurance (PHI). 
Supplementary PHI Dummy for holding supplementary private insurance. Imputed from observations of 
the same person in other years, when missing. 
No. family insured kids Number of children in the household covered under contribution-free family 
insurance through the SHI membership of a spouse or parent. 
Poor health Self-assessed current health on a scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (very good). 
Disability degree Officially assessed and certified degree of disability. 
Age Age of person. 
Female Dummy for women. 
No. of children Number of children under 17 years of age in the household. 
Spouse family insured Dummy for a person whose spouse is covered under his or her statutory health 
insurance membership. 
Age of spouse Age of a person’s spouse. 
Spouse paying SHI Dummy for a person whose spouse is covered under and paying contributions for 
statutory health insurance. 
Spousal poor health Self-assessed current health on a scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (very good) of a 
person’s spouse. 
Spousal disability deg. Officially assessed and certified degree of disability of a person’s spouse. 
Labor income (€100) Labor income per month before tax, deflated by the CPI (in €100). 
Spousal labor inc. (€100) Labor income per month before tax, deflated by the CPI (in €100) of a person’s 
spouse. 
High school degree Dummy for a person who has completed secondary education with a university 
entrance qualification. 
Apprenticeship Dummy for a person who has completed vocational training. 
Higher techn. college Dummy for a person who has completed a higher technical college, a health care 
school, or civil service training. 
University degree Dummy for a person who has a university degree. 
Married Dummy for a married person. 
East Dummy for a person living in the area of former East Germany or Berlin. 
South Dummy for a person living in Baden-Wuerttemberg or Bavaria. 
North Dummy for a person living in Schleswig-Holstein or Lower Saxony. 
Work exp. (10 yrs)a Prior work experience (in years divided by 10). 
Unemployment exp.a Unemployment experience (in years). 
German citizenship Dummy for a person holding German citizenship. 
Self-employed father Dummy for a person whose father was self-employed when the respondent was 15 
years old. 
Willingness to take risks General willingness to take risks (scale 0-10, imputed if missing).  
Duration employment spell a Number of years spent in the current spell of paid employment (used to generate set 
of 11 dummy variables). 
Note: Dummy variables equal 1 if condition holds and 0 otherwise. 
a Uses information from the lifetime employment history in the SOEP. 
Table A 3: Average marginal effects of further variables 
 Estimations from Table 3  Estimations from Table 5 
 Full sample Men Women Inc. splines Altern. health  Full Sample Men Women 
HI cost diff. (€100) -0.0038*** -0.0068*** -0.0007 -0.0037*** -0.0039***     
 (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0010)     
Poor health -0.0025* -0.0057** -0.0004 -0.0022*   -0.0019 -0.0059*** 0.0005 
 (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0012)   (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0014) 
Disability degree     -0.0199**     
     (0.0099)     
Age -0.0007*** -0.0006 -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.0008***  -0.0005** -0.0004 -0.0004* 
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
Supplementary PHI -0.0003 0.0022 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003  0.0013 0.0078 -0.0019 
 (0.0028) (0.0052) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0028)  (0.0027) (0.0049) (0.0029) 
Age of spouse 0.0000 0.0008* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0007* -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
Spousal poor health -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0021   -0.0029** -0.0044 -0.0019 
 (0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0014)   (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0017) 
Spousal disability deg.     0.0024     
     (0.0120)     
No. of children 0.0025** 0.0070*** -0.0017 0.0025** 0.0027**  0.0039*** 0.0076*** 0.0006 
 (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0012)  (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0018) 
Female -0.0342***   -0.0326*** -0.0352***  -0.0265***   
 (0.0042)   (0.0040) (0.0043)  (0.0032)   
Paying SHI member       -0.0205*** -0.0333*** -0.0017 
       (0.0039) (0.0060) (0.0050) 
Family insurance       -0.0376*** -0.0585*** -0.0217*** 
       (0.0051) (0.0116) (0.0059) 
No. family insured kids       -0.0030* -0.0037 -0.0024 
       (0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0020) 
Spouse family insured       0.0113* 0.0027 -0.0188*** 
       (0.0066) (0.0098) (0.0027) 
Spouse paying SHI       0.0019 -0.0062 0.0031 
       (0.0037) (0.0077) (0.0039) 
Observations       88,721 42,375 46,346 
Notes: The table shows average marginal effects for selected continuous variables and average discrete changes from the base level for selected binary variables. The 
estimates are conditional on being selected into the main estimation sample, i.e. on being a paid employee. They are based on the estimated models of Table 3 and 
Table 5. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering at the individual level. */**/***: Significance of the coefficient at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv29, 2000-2012. 
 
Table A 4: Selection into being a regular employee 




Poor health -0.0378*** -0.0558*** -0.0185 -0.0378***  
 (0.0103) (0.0153) (0.0140) (0.0103)  
Disability degree     -0.0562 
     (0.0801) 
Age -0.0713*** -0.0367*** -0.0752*** -0.0713*** -0.0718*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0061) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Age of spouse -0.0026 -0.0143*** -0.0010 -0.0026 -0.0025 
 (0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Spousal poor health 0.0269** 0.0103 0.0520*** 0.0269**  
 (0.0134) (0.0205) (0.0175) (0.0134)  
spouse_disabl_share     0.0627 
     (0.0826) 
Spousal labor inc. (€100) -0.0031*** -0.0023** -0.0022*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Female 0.2334***   0.2334*** 0.2334*** 
 (0.0291)   (0.0291) (0.0291) 
No. of children -0.0906*** -0.1051*** -0.0575*** -0.0906*** -0.0909*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0172) (0.0199) (0.0200) 
Female * no. of children 0.0191   0.0191 0.0197 
 (0.0254)   (0.0254) (0.0254) 
High school degree 0.0960*** -0.0042 0.1046** 0.0960*** 0.0982*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0521) (0.0429) (0.0327) (0.0327) 
Apprenticeship 0.2019*** 0.1831*** 0.2014*** 0.2019*** 0.2025*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0458) (0.0409) (0.0305) (0.0305) 
Higher techn. college 0.1464*** 0.0865 0.1757*** 0.1464*** 0.1462*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0541) (0.0450) (0.0346) (0.0346) 
University degree 0.1694*** 0.0834 0.1382*** 0.1694*** 0.1718*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0580) (0.0502) (0.0373) (0.0373) 
Married 0.1900*** 0.2785*** 0.0689* 0.1900*** 0.1895*** 
 (0.0284) (0.0456) (0.0368) (0.0284) (0.0284) 
East -0.0096 -0.0820* 0.0805* -0.0096 -0.0086 
 (0.0299) (0.0430) (0.0416) (0.0299) (0.0300) 
South 0.0511* 0.1101** 0.0128 0.0511* 0.0525* 
 (0.0291) (0.0447) (0.0386) (0.0291) (0.0291) 
North 0.0898** -0.0085 0.1704*** 0.0898** 0.0920** 
 (0.0387) (0.0606) (0.0488) (0.0387) (0.0387) 
Work exp. (10 yrs) 1.4091*** 0.8066*** 1.6209*** 1.4091*** 1.4104*** 
 (0.0424) (0.0833) (0.0537) (0.0424) (0.0424) 
Work exp. squared -0.1821*** -0.1087*** -0.2303*** -0.1821*** -0.1823*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0143) (0.0128) (0.0094) (0.0094) 
Unemployment exp. -0.2100*** -0.2669*** -0.1960*** -0.2100*** -0.2118*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0176) (0.0153) (0.0115) (0.0116) 
Unempl. exp. squared 0.0089*** 0.0103*** 0.0082*** 0.0089*** 0.0090*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
German citizenship 0.1451*** 0.1242* 0.1419** 0.1451*** 0.1441*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0680) (0.0620) (0.0455) (0.0455) 
Self-employed father -0.2902*** -0.4629*** -0.1259** -0.2902*** -0.2926*** 
 (0.0435) (0.0631) (0.0588) (0.0435) (0.0436) 
Willingness to take risks -0.0389*** -0.0637*** -0.0205*** -0.0389*** -0.0382*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
Full set of year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Children below 3 years -0.0032 -0.0302 -0.9129*** -0.0031 0.0002 
 (0.0339) (0.0349) (0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0338) 
Children below 6 years 0.1026*** 0.0730** -0.2427*** 0.1026*** 0.0998*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0323) (0.0279) (0.0318) (0.0318) 
Female * children below 3 -0.9142***   -0.9142*** -0.9171*** 
 (0.0475)   (0.0475) (0.0475) 
   Continued on the following page. 
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Female * children below 6 -0.3587***   -0.3586*** -0.3573*** 
 (0.0418)   (0.0418) (0.0419) 
Constant 1.8271*** 2.0987*** 1.7326*** 1.8272*** 1.8139*** 
 (0.0938) (0.1849) (0.1083) (0.0938) (0.0899) 
 -0.0758 -0.1853 -0.1010 -0.0656 -0.0735 
Test of =0: p-value 0.4714 0.0108 0.4556 0.5456 0.4873 
Observations 84,300 39,462 44,838 84,300 84,265 
Selected observations 56,558 28,451 28,107 56,558 56,538 
Notes: The table shows the estimated equations of selection into being a paid employee, which belong to the 
main estimation results displayed in Table 3. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering 
at the individual level.  is the selection correction term. 
*/**/***: Significance of the coefficient at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv29, 2000-2012. 
 
Appendix B: Estimation of private health insurance premiums 
To calculate the HICD, PHI premiums in case of counter-factual self-employment must be 
predicted. Therefore, we first run an OLS regression of observed private health insurance 
premiums of actually self-employed persons on characteristics determining PHI premiums. As 
mentioned before, premiums depend on age, gender, and a health assessment taking place when 
the PHI contract is signed. This puts the consumer into a risk class. Therefore, we recover the 
age and health in the year that the self-employed person first entered PHI from the panel data 
and use them as explanatory variables in the PHI premium regression, along with gender. For 
all members within a risk class, premiums continue to rise with ageing, but new medical 
conditions do not affect the premiums anymore, because they are fully insured. We model this 
by additionally including the duration of the PHI contract. 
If more than one family member is covered under PHI, one family member usually pays 
(and therefore knows about) the total amount paid for all of them. Therefore, the SOEP 
questionnaire asks if a person with PHI pays premiums and if so, how much and how many 
persons this covers. We incorporate this in the regression by controlling for a spouse who is 
included in this PHI amount, and for the number of children included; PHI premiums are lower 
for children than for adults. We also include information on co-payments, which reduce 
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premiums, and eligibility for financial support from the government in case of sickness, which 
is granted to civil servants and their children and also to the spouse if his or her income remains 
below a threshold. Information on co-payments is only available in 2000-2001 and 2007-2011, 
so we only use these years in the regression and control for time dummies. 
The estimated coefficients in Table B 1 confirm expectations. Premiums increase with age 
and poorer health when signing the contract, but also with the duration of the contract, and 
women pay more. The premium for PHI coverage of a spouse is more than double the amount 
for an additional child covered. Co-payments in the form of fixed amounts or percentage shares 
reduce premiums, although the latter effect is insignificant. Government financial support for 
civil servants and their families decreases average premiums by more than half because PHI 
only has to cover half the costs in case of sickness, and the civil servants are a comparably low 
risk group. When using the equation to predict PHI premiums for currently paid employees in 
the counter-factual case of self-employment, we adjust the variables for a spouse and children 
that must be covered under PHI according to the household’s situation. We also set the co-
payment amounts and shares to zero. This makes the costs most comparable to SHI, which does 
not have co-payments (except for small fees of €10 once a quarter for visiting a doctor since 
2004). 
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Table B 1: Regression of private health insurance premiums per month 
 Dep. var.: Monthly PHI premiums 
Age at begin of PHI contract 16.7597*** 
 (3.4231) 
Age at begin of PHI contract squared -0.1478*** 
 (0.0446) 




Poor health at begin of PHI contract 14.7716** 
 (6.6515) 
Spouse co-insured in PHI 191.7486*** 
 (49.0995) 
Additional number of co-insured persons 67.4930*** 
 (10.9221) 
Co-payment amount -0.0149*** 
 (0.0056) 
Co-payment share -0.3411 
 (0.4974) 
Eligible for civil servant health benefits -174.9300*** 
 (22.2966) 
Year 2001 -77.5841*** 
 (17.2838) 
Year 2007 -40.2442*** 
 (12.1492) 
Year 2008 -18.0083 
 (12.6121) 
Year 2009 -3.7468 
 (12.0770) 




R2  0.3997 
Observations 689 
Mean of the dependent variable 320.1729 
Notes: The dependent variable in this OLS regression is private health insurance premium per 
month. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Definitions of the variables 
appear in Table A 2. 
*/**/***: Significance of the coefficient at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SOEPv29, 2000-2012. 
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